Llanquitruz and the Mapuche-Tehuelche “war machine”: continuities and discontinuities in the Patagonian indigenous geopolitics (1850-1880)

Llanquitruz y la “máquina de guerra” mapuche-tehuelche: continuidades y rupturas en la geopolítica indígena patagónica (1850-1880)

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ABSTRACT

In order to elucidate the metamorphosis of the Mapuche-Tehuelche chiefdoms in Northern Patagonia between 1850 and 1880, this paper compares the corpuses of correspondence written in Spanish by cousins Llanquitruz and Saygüeque with the assistance of their secretaries, during critical times in their respective chiefdoms. The author explores the qualitative changes between each political structure, proposing a review of the trope of the “war machine”, a concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari, useful to reason upon the nomadic strategies and their ambivalence in relation to power. The article recalls this metonymy to analyze the dynamics of negotiation and conflict between these chiefdoms and the emerging state of Argentina. It also recognizes the Mapuche-Tehuelche representations of the structures of power and kinship, territory and geopolitics, by focusing on texts produced by indigenous people.


The Headquarters of Cousins Llanquitruz and Saygüeque

[...] my deceased father was a Warrior man (LLANQUITRUZ, May 31, 1856)
[...] my deceased father Chocorí left me given to know that the inhabitants increase in peace and tranquility (SAYgüEQUE, July 7, 1879).

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The changes between 1856 and 1879 are the starting point to explain the several characterizations that cousins José María Bulnes Llanquitruz and Valentin Saygüeque chose to remember their parents, in the face of Buenos Aires and Argentine authorities. If Llanquitruz pointed out that his father had been a "warrior man", Saygüeque emphasized his advice on the importance of "peace and tranquility". While the brothers Cheuqueta and Chocorí had formed a seamless tandem during the first half of the 19th century, one wonders why their children emphasized opposed political guidelines, that is, what relationship was the invention of each parental tradition with the height of each chieftdom with the interval of two decades. If war pride was a flag to force peace with the Buenos Aires State in 1856, the discourse of 1879 seeks to defend the agreements reached by these lineages, when the national State did everything to break them.

The first of the two headquarters was brief. After the assassination of Llanquitruz in a city of Bahía Blanca in 1858 until the peak of the "Indian Governor of Las Manzanas" of Saygüeque during the 1870s, there were events that re-ordered the socio-political structures and facilitated the interference of the State in Patagonia. Successively, the replacements of Llanquitruz to control the lower course of the river Negro were his youngest brother Benito Chingoleo Cheuqueta and Miguel Linares, a nephew of Saygüeque.¹ These "wild mediators", according to the term coined by Richard (2010) for the equivalent biographies of Chaco, were endorsed by the Argentine authorities with the aim of disciplining the indigenous families according to a hierarchical order that extended "Tierra Adentro". In that context, the radical developments of the Chieftainship of Saygüeque were the instituted place upon which its power was built, the strengthening of the enduring Covenant with the nation-State in the making, the militarization of the relations of kinship and the construction of new indigenous identifications. The process was accompanied by an unknown level of wealth accumulation and extension of networks that connected the Mapuche nodes with Christians in Argentina and Chile. "Indigenous Governor of Las Manzanas" was the name of the project and the headquarters of Saygüeque, a structure that would be formally recognized though in an ephemeral way by Julio Argentino Roca, completely

¹ Note that all of them carried Christian names, which showed the State effort to incorporate them but also the willingness to mapuche-tehuelche historically register partnerships with the hispano-criollos through the onomastic, magical and political exchange that would convert into baptized to become another person or his attributes would be brought, as well as updating the evolution of the partnerships (MENARD, 2010, p. 69-70).
stressed between subordination to the State and the trend of mapuche-tehuelche sovereignty.²

During the 1850s and 1860s, the brothers Llanquitruz and Chingoleo Cheuqueta laid the premises for the emergence of cousin Saygüeque through the preliminary fabric of networks, the rhetoric of lineage, the police power over the River Negro, the growing verticality of kinship, the initiation into Criollo diplomacy, the bureaucracy and alphabetic writing in Spanish, as well as protecting the territorial nucleus and the autonomy of the country of Las Manzanas in the South of the province of Neuquén. Briefly, these were the conclusions of my previous studies on the accumulation of power that capitalized Saygüeque (VEZUB, 2009; among others). This article seeks to deepen the Llanquitruz antecedent to this political construction, which was his historical intervention, to what extent it led to a new type of relationship between the mapuches and the State in the North of Patagonia.

The axis to track the continuities and breaches are the reading of the correspondences these cousins wrote with the help of literate scribes. As well as starting from their awnings in transit between one and another headquarter, writing was at the same time an indicator and a factor of change. Thus, it is suggested that a scribe has collaborated with them in different periods, the valdiviano José de Carmen Marques Bravo,³ José Antonio Loncochino, the principal Secretary of the "Indigenous Govern of Las Manzanas", later gained notoriety at least from 1874. The literate mapuche in a mission of Valdivia was who introduced both Catholic and Republican rhetoric, as well as the regularization of style and bureaucratic practices in the awning. This work focuses on the comparison of the letters of each pair of chief and Secretary, for the purposes of determining the political transformations and the uniqueness of each headquarters.

Although the texts preserved from Llanquitruz are scarce in comparison to the ones from Saygüeque,⁴ they are sufficient for viewing that the former intervened more directly than the latter in the writing process. Llanquitruz printed crosses as proof of faith with a stroke which was different from the calligraphy of the scribe, signing in his

² Letter from Conrado Villegas to the "Governor of las Manzanas Cacique Don Valentin Saygüeque", August 19, 1879, Archivo General de la Nación (in later AGN) VII, dossier 723, p. 10.
³ AGN VII, dossier 723, pp. 296 y 300.
⁴ At the time, there were ten pieces of correspondence sent by Llanquitruz in 1856 and 1857, eight of them in dossier X, 19. 4. 5 in AGN and two others that were transcribed by Cox (1863, p. 177-178). All were published in a recent compilation of Mapuche letters (PAVEZ OJEDA, 2008). As part of an always expandable corpus, in the case of Saygüeque, now there are known to have thirty-six documents issued by its secretariat, most of them on the AGN dossiers (room VII, 155, 723, Museo Histórico Nacional 50). Several of these documents were glossed or transcribed, partially or completely, in several publications (HUX, 1991; LEVAGGI, 2000; DURÁN, 2006; PAVEZ OJEDA, 2008).
own handwriting the Treaty with the State of Buenos Aires in 1857. Furthermore, and even more surprising, he did write a letter with his own blood in the absence of ink, fact that caught the attention of the Commander of Carmen de Patagones Benito Villar, to whom the letter was addressed.\textsuperscript{5} In several aspects, Llanquitruz’s words and brands were imprinted as significantly as the letter of the Secretary Marques Bravo. The corporal relationship of Llanquitruz with the writing, where the ritual importance of bleeding for registering partnerships is perceived, will be publicized in the case of Saygüeque, although it also contains his letters in first person and boasted exercised control over the "styles" of oral or written communication, either in "the Christian Castile language" or when heading the "Commission in the style of his language".\textsuperscript{6}

Finally, by comparing the payrolls of caciques Llanquitruz and Saygüeque said to have lead respectively in 1856 and 1880, the author proposes a revision of the "war machine", the trope made by Deleuze and Guattari (1988) from the work of Pierre Clastres, to determine the "nomadic" strategies in face of the crystallization of power.\textsuperscript{7}

The author readdresses the figure of the "war machine" to think these historically concrete headquarters, which were in the spatial and temporal line of the nation-State but not necessarily left to it. The "nomadism" category has been postponed by the political anthropology to explain the mobility of hunter-gatherers, pastors and mapuche-tehuelches traders of the 19th century, who followed preset routes connecting seasonal places with permanent camping sites, stays and hispano-criollos enclaves by virtue of the use of resources and political alliances (BOSCHÍN; DEL CASTILLO BERNAL, 2005).

But the "nomadism" of those philosophers deserves to be picked up because it avoids the structuralist or evolutionary connotations that have traditionally been thought by leadership societies as a transit to the State (LEVI-STRAUSS, 1967; CARNEIRO, 1981; EARLE, 1991), enabling the identification of active subjects and complex social practices. The theoretical and empirical usufruct of the "war machine" shall be provisional, metaphorical and unstable, such as Deleuze and Guattari translated in the analysis of the phenomena of power in other areas such as sexuality, relationships, or science, in accordance with a model of evolution and heterogeneity which would raise more scientific problems than the ones it would be able to solve, a

\textsuperscript{5} AGN X, 19. 4 y X, 27. 7. 6
\textsuperscript{6} AGN VII, dossier 723, pp. 419-424
\textsuperscript{7} Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1988) deployed the trope in chapter "1227 Tratado de nomadologia: la máquina de guerra", included in the book Mil mesetas, capitalism y esquizofrenia. Pierre Clastres (1981, p. 213-215) analyzed the "original war" as the institution that guarantees the internal non-division of the community, while promoting the centrifugal forces that hinder the unification under the sign of the State.
morphological practice attentive to the social topology, that instead of "representing", it "generates and runs" (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 368-378).

Taking the part for the whole, the war technology for the social structure, Deleuze and Guattari described the "war machines" as artifacts found in relation to the exteriority and complete respect for the State, which offers an alternative to the conception of the headquarters as an evolutionary stage that anticipates the State society. The expression "Tierra Adentro", always recurring in the sources of the 19th century in River Plata, is symptomatic of the interiority that the criollo society established with the indigenous world, where the State appeared to be the only structure foreign to the social borders. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the chefferie or "headquarter" would have diffuse collective mechanisms to prevent or avert power, while the arms of the Chief would be the prestige and persuasion. In search of an alternative policy to Foucault's "black history", they considered that the emergence of the State has no historical explanation, it is the main feature of a "monstrous society" placed in antagonism with the societies reluctant to power.

Clastres' thesis on the antinomy between community and power is also taken up by Sahlins, who argued that power is not represented as an intrinsic social status but as an usurpation, as "[...] it reveals and describes itself as the breakdown of the moral order of the people, precisely as the most serious offence against the kinship: fratricide, patricide, the union of mother and son, father and daughter or brother and sister." (SAHLINS, 1988, p. 85). It was in this direction that the authors used the category of the "jefes-parientes", or “relative-chiefs”, to describe the social and political morphology of Northern Patagonia during the second half of the 19th century. Campagna (2002), who had worked on thinking the emergence of the "pristine state" in ancient Egypt, argues that it is not possible to determine from the structures of kinship why some people order and others are obey, or how to establish a hierarchical system of domination.

As a "machine war" category of the "Treaty of nomadology" by Deleuze and Guattari, it is provisional and limited. As a trope, it uses the words in ways other than what they are properly entitled. We must remember that Clastres developed his ethnography on the "Chaco warrior societies" a few decades after Bolivia and Paraguay fought in 1932-35 for the region, without even mentioning the conflagration. As warned by Capdevila, Combès and Richard (2008, p. 38), "[...] there is something paroxysmal to it, on that same landscape devastated by a war between States and for the State, the French philosopher theorized the function against the State of the Indian wars.
However, the distortions of the trope did not subtract his power to discuss the adaptive evolution that understood the headquarters.

With these guidelines and warnings as a starting point, the author continues the metamorphosis of the Patagonian chiefdoms focusing on the critical preliminaries to the agreement reached by Llanquitruz with the State of Buenos Aires in 1856 and 1857, the treaty that laid the foundations for peace and the hegemonic balance between both political structures until 1879.

Works on the chiefdoms of the second half of the 19th century in Pampa and Patagonia have emphasized the disputes over the control of the territory, resources, traffic routes and indigenous socio-political networks (TAMAGNINI; PÉREZ ZAVALA, 2002; VILLAR; JIMÉNEZ, 2003; MANDRINI; ORTELLI, 2006; DE JONG; RATTO, 2008; among others). Bechis (2008, p. 38-39) introduced the concept of "geopolitics", extending its current usage beyond the State societies, although without exceeding certain expansionist or static view of the territorial logic. 8 Bello Maldonado (2001), on the other hand, raises the exchange the appropriation of land between the Mapuches of the 19th century recognized a material dimension and one of symbolic-cultural nature, which enabled both tangible and virtual integration of discontinuous territories by groups on both sides of the Andes. More recently, Chilean anthropology analyzed the mapuche conception of territory as a file, or area of registration and updating of partnerships, through the onomastics and toponymy (PAVEZ OJEDA, 2006, 2008; MENARD, 2010). Finally, the author reaches the level of microanalysis on how the mapuche-tehuelche "war machines" practiced the geopolitics in relation to the emerging State, the Christians and other indigenous groups, how they organized and included territorial and regional spaces into concrete circumstances or what were the relations of the populations of "Tierra Adentro" with the "Indians from the village" which constitute the main workforce of Christian enclaves as Carmen de Patagones, since its installation in 1779.

The "Matador Guapo" and the Pampa Brand of the Lineage

Both cousins were around thirty years old when they launched an unexpected attack on Carmen de Patagones to force an agreement with the authorities in 1856. On the following year, they would achieve their objective with the signing of the Treaty, which was also desired by the State of Buenos Aires, and then clashed with the

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8 "This class of planning and territorial expansión is what I call geopolitics. [...] Since we are dealing with stateless societies, the concept required some modifications. I propose to define geopolitics as the intentional occupation of a space with the purpose of supporting the interest of the mother group that belong to this territory" (BECHIS, 2008, p. 38).
Argentina Confederation of Paraná⁹. The spate of covenants began with others regarding radicals as Catriel and Cachul, pointing out the first steps of the Buenos Aires strategy that would alter the balance of the borders until the end of the 1870s. The letter exchange with Commander Benito Villar, and between the latter and the Buenos Aires authorities, enhances the Llanquitruz initiative and the local dimension of the agreement, which was conceived as a problem of territoriality and livestock supply from the mapuche-tehuelches perspective. For them, it was basically the solution to the conflict for the control of the River Negro between equivalent headquarters, identified almost in personal terms, i.e. the "main head of the Indians" Llanquitruz, and the "Commander of Patagones" Villar.

The approximate age of Llanquitruz is known by different sources, and, according to the stories about his childhood heard by William Cox, he would have been captured by the "Picun-Pehuenche" and delivered for servitude in Chillán, where he would have escaped to the death of his father to be placed under the influence of Calfucurá, who would have come into competition by merit and personality to lead the couples forces and lead the "Tehuelche" from the South of Limay, who had previously defeated with the help of "[...] the young men who ruled, and who were addicted". Cox (1863, p. 176) stated that Cheuqueta "[...] was chieftain at Puelmapu (land of the East)". From the captivity of his son Llanquitruz in Chilean territory comes the Christian name, taken from President Manuel Bulnes.

The letters written during the unexpected attack in autumn, 1856 stated that Llanquitruz exercised and claimed an ancestral territoriality over the lower course of the River Negro and that he was willing to transfer it, but not entirely nor in all its

⁹ In 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas, Governor of the province of Buenos Aires, defeated in the battle of Caseros by the Great Ally Army of South America, headed by the Governor of Entre Ríos Justo José de Urquiza, also of federal extraction as Rosas. The Great Army consisted of people from the provinces of Corrientes and Entre Ríos, in addition to the Empire of Brazil and Uruguay. Then a process of three decades is initiated, characterized by the formation of the National State. The first ten years were marked by competition between the Argentine Confederation based in the Argentine capital - whose first President was Urquiza - and the State of Buenos Aires, which remained independent of the remaining thirteen provinces to triumph over the Confederation in the battle of Pavón. This coexistence was capitalized by the mapuche-tehuelches chiefdoms, which recovered territoriality northward and eastward, allying with one or another State. After reunification in 1862, there were until 1880 the "founding presidencies" of Bartolomé Mitre, Domingo Sarmiento and Nicolás Avellaneda. The hegemony of Buenos Aires in Mitre's Presidency was being altered in favor of an alliance between factions of the Interior and of Buenos Aires itself, until the national State was matured, imposing sovereignty over the provincial autonomies, including Buenos Aires, with the triumph of Julio Argentino Roca for the Presidency of the country. The war of Paraguay, the crushing of the caudillos of the Interior and the revolutions of Buenos Aires, along with the expansion on indigenous territories, marked the process of constituting a political unit, during which interests were articulated among the provincial elites and a national market was developed integrated to the international ones, based on the export of livestock products. A recent compilation shows how the process of formation of the national political system also happened from the suburbs to the center (BRAGONI; MÍGUEZ, 2010).
aspects. Commander Del Villar introduced Llanquitruz as "cacique son of Patagones", as well as telling the Minister of War and Navy Bartolomé Mitre that during the peace talks of the preceding decade, Commander García and Llanquitruz’ father had exchanged their own children as hostages. Llanquitruz himself would justify by not moving from Bajada Balcheta, fifty-five leagues to the West, "[... ] because I have my mother very near from where these unexpected attacks, where my family lives". A few days later, he wrote to Villar from "Paso Chocorí", the name of the area matching the name of a recently deceased uncle. 10 However, even more significant to determine the social and territorial familiarity are the notable neighbors of Carmen de Patagones, merchants and landowners, directing collectively and obsequiously to "our beloved Yanquetruz" to historicize the link and the lineage commitment to the enclave:

We know your heart, and it is impossible that it is not as noble and generous as the ones from your grandparents’ Chiefs. Chief Negro, former owner of these fields, sold them to the Government and lived with our parents as a brother and friend until his death. His son, Chief Chamyl, followed his advice and his example, and has left the memory of his friendship in our hearts. And you, descendent of the blood of noble, friendly and generous Indians, could be any longer our enemy? (June 5, 1856, AGN X, 19. 4. 5).

That Llanquitruz and Saygüeque directly descended from Chief Negro was a fact that was highly sought after by ethnologists from the mid-20th century, and this letter now comes to ratify it. However, Claraz, a surveyor and Swiss naturalist who went from Rio Negro to Chubut in the company of a party of Indians in 1865, mentioned the peace efforts between the Government of Buenos Aires and Llanquitruz, "a son or grandson of Chief Negro". Claraz adds that the heart of the efforts were the claims of land which Llanquitruz made, although "[...] the Government used ambiguous terms that could be interpreted very differently" (CLARAZ, 1988, p. 171).11 The ethnologists insisted in the lineage of Llanquitruz, aware as they were to the prestigious status of these lineages they classified as "pampas", "günüña küne" or "Northern tehuelches", with territory between the Rivers Negro and Chubut (HARRINGTON, 1946; ESCALADA, 1949; VIGNATI, 1972; CASAMIQUELA, 2004). 12 However, it is important

10 All these letters were sent in June, 1856: the one from Villar to Mitre on the 4th, from Carmen de Patagones, the ones from Llanquitruz from Bajada Balcheta on the 16th and from Paso Chocorí on the 7th (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
11 The French naturalist Alcide d’Orbigny had already pointed out during his stay in Carmen de Patagones during 1829 that "[...] the Spaniards had bought from Chief Negro the shores of River Negro when in 1779 they wanted to found Carmen, as I was able to verify in the same files from the Fort" (D’ORBIGNY, 1999, p. 503), initiating an early historiographic practice in the subject.
12 Among other biographies and regional stories reporting on Carmen de Patagones, Llanquitruz and the raids he was part of, one can consult Sánchez Ceschi (1938), Paesa (1971) and especially Hux
to highlight the historical and territorial continuity between a Chief who had sold the fields of Carmen de Patagones to the King of Spain and his great-grandson, who resumed the talks seventy years later, those notable Argentine legitimizing their noble arguments, regardless of the opportunism and the ambiguity of the commitments stated by Claraz.

It is also possible to find ethnic names or identifications in this corpus of correspondence from 1856, such as "Tehuelches", "Pampas" and "Chilean", used to distinguish the southern origin respectively, from the Northern Patagonian interior and the range of different groups of relatives and friends who participated in the attack. There were three hundred men fighting under the command of Llanquitruz, Coliguala, Paillacan and Huincahual, who took away one thousand, seven hundred cattle and horses from the farms in the South shore of the River Negro, with partly contradictory objectives: meeting those who were mobilized and forcing Buenos Aires authorities to negotiate the Treaty. In the boom of the Criolla authorities, these classifications were conflicting, overlapping and unstable, but they were attempting to associate regional identities with certain political ethos. Commander Del Villar alluded to the prominence of the "Indians from the Chief of the Tehuelche Huincahual" in the looting,\(^{13}\) who would be later idealized by ethnological literature as the Argentine Indian friend par excellence. On the other hand, adding to this further classification, the missive conciliation of notables attributed the appropriation of livestock to the "Chileans", expressing the willingness of resigning with them to favor peace with Llanquitruz "[...] and with the Tehuelche our neighboring and countrymen, and with the Pampas that also inhabit these fields".\(^{14}\)

Being a great-grandson and grandson of the great references of River Negro was a necessary condition, but not reason enough, to lead the socio-political structures of the 1850s. Llanquitruz had won this place in 1855, during a previous attack on San Antonio de Iraola, further to the North, in the current Buenos Aires party of Benito Juárez. According to the story heard by the Chilean ethnographer Tomás Guevara at the beginning of the 20th century, Llanquitruz would have been "a mapuche matador or huapo" to whom bullets would not reach thanks to the pact in salamanca, in what seems the first magical activation of Llanquitruz as "machine". After the national guards had shot hundreds of times, the owners of the stores in San Antonio concluded

\(^{13}\) Carmen de Patagones, 4 de junio 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
\(^{14}\) The neighbors of Patagones to Llanquitruz, June 5, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
that with this "cutler it was useless to be opposed". On his return, Llanquitruz claimed to his Chiefs and captains, who gave him part of the harness. No one would have complained and, according to the story

[...]

Since then, when this brave went to the village, he met many chiefs, many people. He was a kind of chief, and was remembered more than all the chiefs at that time. His death happened many years later, died suddenly, by huecufutun, since he had already served his term. All cutlers have their time limited. This one entered Cura Malal to become langenmtufe (matador, brave) (GUEVARA, 1911, p. 111-112).

In addition to the fascination that he exercised on his teammates and rivals to leave such a remembrance, memory shows the emergence of a new Chief. Llanquitruz was followed by many people for the advantages implied, but was also characterized as limited time "cutlery" under a spell, someone who “was as a chief”, very handsome but overly exposed, without any reference to the prestige of the family, although the testimony linked him to Calfucurá, with whom he lived in "Arjentinu mapu" in "a little place called Huilliche". San Antonio would leave traumatic and enduring marks on both sides of the war. Commander Del Villar conveyed to Mitre that the opening words of Llanquitruz when negotiating with him in the following year were to boast of “[...] his exploits on our unhappy Otamendi and Captain Ramos, boasting about the spurs from the former he wore on his feet, and of Captain Ramos’ guns, which he also brought on his waist”. Both led the canton where only two soldiers survived from a total of one hundred and twenty-eight.

Let us focus now on the dynamics of the parliament raid on Carmen de Patagones, a year after the one in San Antonio, Iraola, following the letter from Villar and letters of Llanquitruz that someone attached to the report that raised Mitre to become a Minister. As already stated, Villar explained that at nine o’clock in the morning of May 31, 1856, "under a dense fog", Llanquitruz and a conglomeration of three hundred relatives identified as "Tehuelches", "Pampas" and "Chileans" rose a thousand seven hundred cattle. Two hours later, when the Commander had only been able to gather approximately forty militiamen and veterans of the National Guard,
...A parliament from Yanquetruz is presented to me, proposing peace and giving me the attached letter N° 1 written in blood by this chief from lack of ink. I, despite the disgust, in such a way to negotiate peace, I went into it, directing to him a letter in which I expressed our liveliest wishes of being friends, since two months ago I had sent him a letter from Mr. Governor offering peace and his protection to him as well as all his Indians.

"Disgust", "ridiculous", "gifts of consideration in proof of sincerity" and "letters from all his old friends" evidenced the fear and uncertainty before the mixed signals from Llanquitruz and his companions, who were expected to proceed with "the same legality" in returning the farms they have seized, since "[...] a man who comes to talk of peace treaties is not presented as an enemy, and does not start the negotiations with a vandal assault".17

The ambiguous behavior of Llanquitruz and the way in which the authorities abominated his eccentric aesthetic remember "mechanisms of ideological embodiment" belonging to the imposition of leaderships, verified in past occasions. It was precisely the case of a homonym of his, murdered in 1788 during the wars between huilliches and pehuenches, fought with the intervention of the Chilean colonial authorities. This Llanketruz of the 18th century, who had configured with his peers the citadel rank of the central Pampas, also used clothes and objects from European origin, obtained in assaults on caravans and farms, "[...] to materialize in a condensed way an ideology that exalted his long history of warlike exploits and persuaded allies of the future duration of his success" (VILLAR; JIMÉNEZ, 2000, p. 688). The performative power of the ideology relied on the display and distribution of boots "impregnated with symbolism", capable of guiding the decisions of friends and enemies. The two Llanquitruz share, as well as the name and a probable genealogy, common territorial reinstallation or installation and vertiginous building of leadership, to which they resorted to the externalization of themselves and others.18 In its boldness, 19th Century "cutlery" Llanquitruz is granted with the 18th Century "corsair" Llanketruz. Clothing stolen and worn in "ridiculous" ways or spurs and guns from the commanders of San Antonio de Iraola that identify the upcoming chief with the attributes of their victims: "Llanquitruz had long wished to kill Otamendi, because he was very handsome", repeated the

17 "From the point of view of the State, the originality of the man of war, his eccentricity, necessarily appears in a negative form: stupidity, deformity, madness, illegitimacy, usurpation, sin..." (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 361).

18 "It is said Villar y Jiménez regarding the 18th Century Llanketruz: "The argument that expertise and value that the victory had been reported in the past would enable him to act with equal effectiveness in the future is symbolically expressed in his attire and objects exhibited, all of which were to convince themselves and others to accompany him on his raids", as a guarantee of arriving at a safe harbor and obtaining a succulent booty" (VILLAR; JIMÉNEZ, 2000, p. 699).
runaway captive. As stated in the first note of this paper, the material or onomastics fetishes instituted magical and political acts that turn the individual into another person, updating the evolution of conflicts and alliances.

After the fulfillment of orders given on May, 31 and the exchange of hostages which included Chingoleo, Llanquitruz’ brother, he presented himself the next day

 [...] dressed in a rich, but ridiculous uniform with epaulettes, round and smooth beaver sombrero, decorated in silver, showing this Indian, all the arrogant pride of a barbarian that comes rather to impose his laws than to talk of peace.

The "disadvantaged position" that Villar was in according to his estimates, forced him to continue treating the chief and his convoy, "to an extreme that his nature rejected", and "[...] to celebrate his presence with targets, rockets and ten shots which were asked as a signal, to his force that remained formed on horseback". The commander stressed that upon entering the village, "[...] this chief son of Patagones was received with great demonstrations of joy, recognizing his friends, hugging them, crying and saying all the time how much he was happy to be surrounded by friends again". Without tears, the commander reflected that

 [...]unable to have feelings and noble procedures, and ignorant of the rights of the people, [...] although coming with the intention of peace, had stolen the farms in case no negotiation was made, only to return them if otherwise.

Villar said he had no other grounds for suspecting of Llanquitruz other "[...] than his barbarian way of opening negotiations for peace". He was shocked because the Commander of the National Guard Pedro Garcia, whom Llanquitruz considered a brother since they had been exchanged as hostages by their parents in the times of Juan Manuel de Rosas, ran the risk of being beheaded if the Indians who held him on the other bank of the river heard seven cannonshots, rather than the required ten. Living desperate hours, Villar could not discern if Llanquitruz acted together with Calfucurá, "[...] if he is an accomplice and traitor like him", in a context that had also initiated the peace talks with Calfucurá. The adjectives varied according to who were targeted and according to Llanquitruz’ tactic, which changed daily, conditioned by the difficulties to conform to his companions and convince them to return the cattle.

Regardless of the conflicts between Calfucurá and Llanquitruz, the alignments were in the process of definition and the authorities had elements to doubt. Through a statement by Félix Guerrero, neighbor of Bahía Blanca who had been "[...] on business..."
to the awnings of Calfucurá ", it is known that he had been notified of the attack to Carmen de Patagones by Llanquitruz himself, who also had informed the President of the Argentina Confederation Justo José de Urquiza. The same trader witnessed Calfucurá had sent to buy spears at the awnings of Catriel, who did not want to sell them. As stated, the latter was the first counterpart of the system of covenants that pushed the State of Buenos Aires in 1856, and had influence upon the families of Llanquitruz and Saygüeque.19

The unsatisfactory responses made Villar decide to interrupt negotiations, as well as capturing the Valdivian Secretary Bravo and eighteen indians, some of "great importance", such as the son of Chief Huincahual and one of Llanquitruz’ nephews. The talks were soon broken following this measure and the imminent possibility of battling, when Llanquitruz warned the Commander of another imminent invasion of the people of Reuquecurá or Reuque, Calfucurá’s brother, as well as returning three captives, some wool and cows that had been recovered from the chiefs accompanying him, who despised this kind of livestock because of the difficulty in transportation when compared to horses.20

The looting of the antagonists, which in turn were "friends", was needed to bind the host under nomadic manner to internally strengthen them and negotiate with the authorities. Llanquitruz’ "war machine" had flexible ideas on "policy" and "the enemy", which could be understood in the light of the synthesis by Carl Schmitt, who argued that the specific political distinction is based on the opposition of the pair “friend-enemy”, where the political enemy is simply the other, who needs not to be stigmatized nor an economic competitor, since one can agree or do business with him, as well as reverse the terms of the relationship when deemed necessary (SCHMITT, 1991).

Unlike García, who had settled with Cheuqueta when Rosas was the governor and exchanged their children in patronage and guarantee, Villar did not assimilate the paradox of the parliament raid to accept the peace offered by Governor Pastor Obligado. The initiative of the Governor allowed Llanquitruz and his people to resume the link interrupted since 1852, returning to Carmen de Patagones from the protection

19 Bahía Blanca, July 4, 1856, report from the Commander of the Argentine Fort to ministry Mitre (AGN X, 19. 4 . 5).
20 “Claraz sought an explanation for the selective return of livestock directly from the protagonists, a decade later. The Swiss Explorer states that once the feed was interrupted with the fall of Rosas, "friendly Indians" who remained seasonally in Carmen de Patagones were forced to flee, among other reasons from smallpox: "They returned later as a raid." Many joined Yanquetruz. Peace was agreed. But Yanquetruz went on to feud with Murga and proposed to depopulate Patagones. He invited the Tehuelche and the pampas. But they only stole horses and mares and refused to herd cows and sheep. They hate this task" (CLARAZ, 1988, p. 103).
of Balcheta, Maquinchao and Las Manzanas, strategic and unattainable territories for the authorities, from which these families deployed seasonal mobility. Llanquitruz was a man of Carmen de Patagones, he was not an upstart regarding territory and indigenous prestige. Other colleagues, such as Huincahual, were also prominent and it has already been mentioned the family imprint on the lower course of the River Negro. The political aggregation of the "Tehuelche", "Pampas" and "Chileans" enabled the global identification of the "mapuche", which were gladly written about in the following decades with Saygüeque and his "Indian Government of Las Manzanas".

Without fatalism, it was much likely that in the political conditions of the 1950s the "brave matador who no bullet could reach" would be shot dead, even more so if we recall the testimony collected by Guevara that "every cutler has a limited time", and similar to the "machines" is ephemeral or is turned off. Now, who would cheer for his entrance in the town of Carmen de Patagones in 1856? Villar notified the commander of Bahía Blanca who accompanied Llanquitruz in several houses "[...] to see if reminding this Indian of his former friends in this town would make him committed to peace he promised me with hugs and a thousand promises". In another communication, it stated that he had recalled that the "chief of the Tehuelche camp",

[...] raised and baptized in this town where he has many very close friends [...] people to whom this Chief wants so much that, in the last invasion, he prevented them to save their families and people, and repeats it effectively, because he carried in his hands a portion of captives and do great damage.22

The mention of these affinities of yesteryear does not clarify who had cheered for him. However, as well as alluding to the business network of merchants and landowners and the experience of youth hostage of the previous decade, the favorable clamor shows that Llanquitruz did not represent a threat to all residents. Despite the seventy years of the hispano-criollo enclave, the social base of Carmen de Patagones remained "pampa", "tehuelche", "Chilean" (and mapuche) and therefore wider, to the point that the ranches on its surroundings would be confused with the area where the relatives of the newly returned lived with the parliament-raid of 1856.

This is how it is described in the collective letter of local notables that was already mentioned, those who wanted peace with Llanquitruz "[...] and with the Tehuelche our neighboring and countrymen, and with the Pampas who also inhabit these areas". Before it was sold "elsewhere", they demonstrated willingness to buy the

21 Benito Villar to the military commander of Bahía Blanca, June 3, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
22 Benito Villar to Bartolomé Mitre, May 8, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
cattle they had taken, proposing to Llanquitruz that his Indians brought leather, "[...] and how much they want to bring to take what they need". The notables included the difficult balance amalgamated by the charisma and the prestige of Llanquitruz and his ability to distribute. Simultaneously, they laid the bases of a quarter-century political and commercial Pact with him and Saygüeque, consisting of the alienation of the Eastern segment of the territory of the lineage and the permission to the Argentine to conquer upstream in exchange for cattle, the control of the flow of trade and the exercise of police functions which were granted to the Indians.

The authorities in Carmen de Patagones understood that there were important chiefs. The adventurous character of Llanquitruz was channeled with the bet of a new order, stated in the relationship with the colonial power that had been laid by his great-grandfather. The upstart fades before the mark of the lineage, who officiates in condition of possibility for personal attributes. The traditional ethnologies that speculated about the role of prestige were neglected by their methodological inconstancy and the practice of obscuring the sources, but also because there was doubt about the status of oral documents, to which more modern historical anthropology recognizes its importance, by showing how are concatenated back and forth with the "memories of their grandparents" (DELRIO, 2005). Even better, noting the way in which the mapuche-tehuelches made use of writing, and how texts produced outside and inside the villages fed these oral reports.23

With his cousin, the "equal class chief" Saygüeque, they were the heirs of the great landlords of the Limay-Negro, of the Northern interior and Las Manzanas of the 18th century. For this reason, Llanquitruz could boast that "Patagones without him would be nobody". Meanwhile, sons of chiefs were in a better position than anyone else to learn how to exercise power and create new conditions, for example, through the experience of youth captivity shared with Saygüeque during the peace of Cheuqueta and Chocorí with commander García in the government of Rosas.

The Blood Inscription of the Parliament and the Agreements

During the meetings in Carmen de Patagones, Llanquitruz used languages, unless it was sure if it was due to the parliamentary ritual or who did not speak Spanish, which would be demented by his captivity in Chillán, the presence and

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23 "Goldsmithing, jewelry, ornamentation, including decoration, are not a script, although their power of abstraction is not lessen. What happens is that that power is agencied otherwise. In regards to writing, the nomads do not have any need to create one, they borrow it from the neighboring sedentary Imperial people who would even provide them with a phonetic transcription of their languages" (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 403).
frequent friendships in Patagones, and the signature stamped on the Treaty of 1857. Somewhat younger, his brother "Benito Villar" Chingoleo Cheuqueta, as well as "being christened" and being sponsored by the commander, would quickly learn that language along with Inacayal the son of Huincahual, during the tenure as hostages to guarantee the agreements.\textsuperscript{24} The use of the categories "miscegenation" and "hybridization", widely accepted in American studies (BOCCARA, 1998; GRUZINSKY, 2000), faces difficulty when it comes to understanding otherness in specific historical situations where differences are enhanced, for example, that autumn of 1856, dedicated to the mutual study between mapuches and christians who distrusted each other.\textsuperscript{25}

In this context, it is interesting to highlight the ambivalence of actual ethnic identifications, like affiliations, alliances and attitudes of those involved, to the point of warning about the limitations of the notion of "ethnic identity" which is traditionally used in anthropological discourse. This ceases to work as a fact a priori, and it is presented as an effect of enunciation of historical, political and strategic contingencies, inseparable from the registration conditions that render them readable and at the same time link these contingencies to the past. In a more radical perspective, the appeal to the interstices the colonization would create between culturally different worlds (GRUZINSKY, 2000, p. 48), does not solves the limits of the notion, such as those specific conditions which enable different positions and also the enunciated "identity" or "identification", including the historian or anthropologist confronted with documentary record, as in this case.

Let us see how to read the words from Llanquitruz through the numbered letters Villar resent to Mitre. In the first letter, Llanquitruz communicates his desire to meet Villar and is justified by not attending his call because "he was never in", ratifying the interruption of contact since 1852 when the fall of Rosas, posed by other documents. He expressed intentions for peace and sends a gift, recommending him to accept it because "[..] I have a whole family and will end with it". Under the signature "argue of J e M a Burnes Llanqitruz", it reads "say I have 596 strong men", after being labeled a "500", a figure he would reconsider as more caciques and indigenous soldiers were added to the convoy or the numbers were stabilized and became more precise. The letter aims to inform Villar he possesses a large kindred and a very significant amount of fighting spears.\textsuperscript{26} In the following letter of May 31, Llanquitruz shows willingness to

\textsuperscript{24} Villar to Llanquitruz, Carmen de Patagones, June 15, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
\textsuperscript{25} Villar Commander points out that Llanquitruz said "... that his father chief Chauqueta when he made peace with Patagones wasn't in homes because this inspired distrust". Benito Villar report to Bartolomé Mitre, Carmen de Patagones, June 4, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
\textsuperscript{26} May [illegible] 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
forget, even though he had wanted to imprison him without giving further explanations. This is where he says that

[…] when staying in my village everybody traveled to taste my father deceased as a warrior man and I feel that my aging people both forget of me without giving me any reason to satisfy and it is precise from this date that we be as brothers and that everything is accommodated.

The lack of punctuation does not allow to specify the relationship Llanquitruz establishes between the provision of workforce or of military manpower to the hispano-criolla village and the characterization of the father as "warrior man", or if this trait also described him. Functional identification between rations and peace appears more clearly. The tension would be dismissed one week after this letter, written in the foggy morning when they were about to clash in an open field. The commander had returned to secretary Bravo, with the need to communicate with the camp of the besiegers, but kept the eighteen prisoners in a more lax condition, insofar as the chief recommended his "[…] people who are arrested to ask for something among their acquaintances if they want trust". Siege, captivity and trade began to interlace.

On 6 June Llanquitruz expressed that a note from Villar had filled him with "rejoice and glory", returning to "put his faith" with stamping crosses and proving his feelings by sending his tailcoat with epaulettes and a horse from his chair as gifts. He requested twenty sets of shirts, shorts, vests, jackets and "white hats", clarifying that they could be of inferior quality, because they were intended to "[…] give reasons to my casiqillos and capitanegos to advise them and not to make traditions". If references to the past and the "seniority" of their parents were permanent in the corpus of Llanquitruz and Saygüeque, they will never be as symptomatically as in this letter, where the need to distribute to avoid betrayal, manifesting that this behavior is associated with the "tradition", slip that will be repeated at least twice in the same set of correspondence.27 "Undoing the knot to the same extent it betrays the covenant", would say Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 360), with regard to Indo-European mythology to explain the behavior of the "war machines" and confirm its externality in relation to the State.

Nearly rendered to the pacification system and State control, Llanquitruz offered his heart because "I am already much reduced" and ordered that there were no war. In a separate page, headed with the title "With the other chiefs", he claimed that

27 Llanquitruz letter to Benito Villar, Paso Chocorí, June 12, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
the authorities recognize the merit of having achieved the synthesis of positions among them, expressing that

I wish with all my heart they are given hugs and hands to make peace and it is not credited to me for it is very painful but to God I say all without restrain that I put over the other chiefs that are in my command.

The document page reproduced below [Picture 2] helps to understand the formal organization of those demonstrating to be under the command of Llanquitruz. The top shows chief "Sayigueqie Chocori". In addition to establishing continuity with the name of the father,28 Saygüeque stands out as the most important member, although then accompanied and separated by a dash also figures Llancaquir as another "number 1" follower. This apparent contradiction reinforces the position of Saygüeque and distinguishes it from the rest as a chief of "the same class" as Llanquitruz, as stated in different documents,29 suggesting that there were several alternatives to being considered "first". Equality of category could live with the subordination of Saygüeque, guaranteed in a written report where the Commander notified the Minister that Llanquitruz, "[...] always consistent in his desire for peace manifests the greatest security that has today make it by the death of the old Chief Chocorí, whose Indians will be at his orders".30 The list is complete with the chiefs Juan (2nd), Paillaquir (3rd), Guircaleu (4th), Naguipichuñ (5th), Coliguala (6th), Teciman (7th), Manquielef (8th) and Jose Garcia (9th), who had the surname of the Commander Carmen de Patagones who were much valued since the times of Rosas.

Llanquitruz’ command structure can be set as follows, with two early chiefs, Saygüeque and Llancaquir, whose equivalent position were reinforced by the abbreviation "ditto" that accompanies the name of Llancaquir, where Saygüeque appears as a direct substitute for Llanquitruz, whose framework is reinforced by the death of father Chocorí, who also explains the lack of detail in this line of followers:

28 This list of 1856 is the earliest documentary mention known about the young Saygüeque, who would no longer sign with the name of the father, died the previous year, in future documents. Then Chocorí will be moved from the presence in Act and full identity to historical legitimacy, every time his son Saygüeque refers to him in correspondence.

29 Command military of Patagones, March 3, 1857 (AGN X, 27. 7. 6).

30 Military Command of Patagones, September 6, 1856 to Mr. Minister of the Departments of War and Navy, Colonel Don Bartolomé Mitre (AGN X. 19. 4. 5).
Naguipichuñ (or Naipichum) will be maintained in a prominent position in the detail so that Saygüeque goes to the Governor of the Patagonian Álvaro Barros twenty-four years later, when he is at the forefront of the "Indian Government of Las Manzanas" who faced the Argentine expansion. Llancaquir was already dead in 1880, but left Nahuelquir as a continuation of other key lineages. Also repeating the names of Guircaleufo and Tucumañ (Teciman), in the second case, it was not the same person but now the mature son of Saygüeque. "Guircaleufo" appears in both lists but his parentage has not been specified or if it is the same individual, but in any case the record shows him as someone very close to Llanquitruz. Coliguala would be Cheuqueta’s cousin (CASAMIQUELA, 2004, p. 31) and, in the case of Manquielef or Manquelao, it was another of Llanquitruz’ brothers, whose murder by the "Tehuelche" will trigger a new parliament-raid whose prolegomena was witnessed by Cox, and that definitely installed Saygüeque’s control over the country of Las Manzanas 1863.

The document ends with another list of "known to give their view in all faith" through the drawing of a cross. The same matches the witnesses to the landowner and justice of the peace of Carmen de Patagones José María Rial, hostage in the camp of Llanquitruz, with other related indigenous people as "manzanero" Puelman, Saygüeque’s future father-in-law, and "pampa" heads Chagayo Chico and Cual, in addition to Cancha, Pancho, Cogo and Ainache, presumably Kalach, who will also be listed by Saygüeque as chief of the "Indian Government of Las Manzanas" in 1880. In the case of the latter, they were people of Chubut territoriality or further south. It

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31 Letter to Álvaro Barros, probably May 1880 (AGN VII, dossier 723, fs. 501-502).
highlights that they are not located under the command of Llanquitruz and his cousin, but as witnesses of the northernmost leadership, which grouped together families from Las Manzanas and Northern Patagonian inland, although one should not rule out that the classification of payrolls between "subordinates" and "witnesses" reflect a division of tasks, such as the inclusion of Puelman in the second category might dictate.32

Six days later from Cabeza de Buey, Llanquitruz accused the receipt of another note from Villar. His stop seemed to be spoiled by the refusal to release the eighteen people held in the command. The chief returned "tips of farms" and left his brother Chingoleo "in clothing" even if that was not the deal. "Mocked and traditioned" [sic], Llanquitruz threatened to go to his payment without waiting for the return of its people. He remembered that days ago he had met and advised to

 [...]all the chiefs making them see that all the people of Patavones came signed asking for making peace and there were no more fights or traditions that I am the main head of all the Indians and advise them.33

He warned the Commander that it was the last answer and "settling the truth", he claimed that "[...] see that my scribe signing for all the chiefs who are under my command that do not know sign and where are giving all their faith with all their hearts". As main chief, he then made a second list of subordinate chiefs, although some of them are mentioned in the documentation with levels of autonomy in looting of livestock and negotiation. It was about the other men who were closely related to the ones enrolled a week earlier: "1st C. Paillacan, 2nd C. Guinca Gual, 3rd C. Bisente, 4th C. Bera, 5th C. Patrisio, 6th C. Gurma, 7th C. Santa Cruz Chico, and 8th C. Liga". This second payroll also includes a name that will be repeated twenty-four years later in the list of those who said to send Saygüeque, Santa Cruz, as well as Paillacan and Huincahual, the parents of Inacayal and Foyel, who would appear framed in the "Indian Government of Las Manzanas".

The conglomerate of relatives who signed these circumstantial alliances of 1856 soon presented flaws, to the point that in the following year Llanquitruz informed the Mayor of Valdivia that Paillacan wanted to switch to the "side" of Calfucurá, recommending that if his son came to appear by the Chilean quarters he would be "clinched with a rod of crickets" (COX, 1863, p. 178). By matching the two lists drawn up by Llanquitruz with a few days apart, the first one brings together the Parliament of the

32 Llanquitruz Benito Villar, June 6, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
33 June 12, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
families and direct relatives, while the second is the result of broader agreements or, in any case, of repeated and precarious understandings.

This instability of the alliances or the leaning of "sides" and "bands" as those who separated the lineage of Calfucurá from Llanquitruz, is explained by the dynamic and contingent nature of the "war machine", by the capacity of families or lineages they sustain to recreate or concentrate genealogies as an "esprit de corps" which is always disturbed and modified.34 Because they did not notice this, and believed that enmity existed at a genetic level, Patagonia ethnologists were puzzled to note that the wars also were ongoing between and against relatives. The lineage would continue to operate as a matrix for the legitimization of the changes, but in the history machine of familiar architects, Cheuqueta and Chocorí, Llanquitruz and Saygüeque parents, were suggested as the base of the political build-up that was known as the "Indian Government of Las Manzanas": the two brothers were identified as "pampas", "gününa küne" or "Northern tehuelches " who became mapuchizan, while at war during the 1820s with the proper southerner "Tehuelche". As said for further debate and context, "[...] in the practical domain, ethnicity is not correspondent to a previously agreed order" (BASCOPÉ JULIO, 2009, p. 65).

Comparing the lists written by Llanquitruz and Saygüeque, twenty-four years apart, changes can be noticed between the Headquarters, the militarization of kinship and the development of the esprit de corps. Llanquitruz wrote a provisional and unstable authority through blood ink, needed two smaller lists, obtained in two successive parliaments, while his representation and leadership were accepted by the rest of the family heads or circumstantial confederates. However, Saygüeque does not seem to require parliaments to reach a consensus on the list compiled by his Secretary Loncochino, which included heads that are geographically very distant, many of whom were not present when the Alliance was updated through the document. Saygüeque raised a centralized list of twenty-eight chiefs and twenty capitanejos, probably more extensive because the manuscript was abducted by the troops of Conrad Villegas in April 1881 and remains truncated in the AGN. Collective bargaining ceded to the individual treaties, although an extensive detail of next of kin and soldier-relatives should be included for ration. The parliamentary ritual was exhausted with Llanquitruz’

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34 "A body not confined to a body, as neither the esprit de corps is reduced to the soul of a body." The spirit is not the best, but it is volatile, while the soul is the center of gravity. Do we have to invoke a military spirit from the body and the esprit de corps? The key is not 'military', but rather a distant nomadic origin. Ibn Khaldoun defined the nomadic war machine by families or lineages, and also esprit de corps. The war machine has a very different relationship with the families and the State. In the war machine, the family, rather than being a basic unit, is a vector of band, and that is why a genealogy goes from one family to another, according to the capacity of the family, at such time, to make the most out of 'solidarity agnatic" (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 372).
correspondence and their handshakes to make peace, or registration with blood. Foyel, the son of Paillacan, whom they recommended to "clinched with a rod of crickets", would return to recognize Saygüeque as his "best Governor", after two decades of family conflicts.35

In a new crisis scenario, Saygüeque sought to resume the clauses broken by the Argentines, seeking to maintain his role as flagellant mediator of Patagonian families. For him, it exhibited alliance of further extension than Llanquitruz' networks but, paradoxically, he was much more weakened than his cousin at the juncture of 1856. The "Indian Government of Las Manzanas" from 1880 and the chiefs under his command were the unfinished project that lasted the preliminary sketch of Llanquitruz, before Saygüeque's real census of power. During the 1860s and 1870s, the concept of the "main head of the Indians" had been metamorphosed until converting Saygüeque into "Governor". It was no longer a question of "sides" as those that faced Calfucurá and Llanquitruz, nor handsome or "thugs", as described by Reuque when recommend "with rage" that he was given "bullet and shrapnel" for not having obeyed.36 As it will be immediately seen, the logic of revenge and the "original war" of Clastres stopped working.

The Impasse of the "War Machine"

Peace between the Buenos Aires enclave of Carmen de Patagones and the lineage which waged the territorial legitimacy over the region was precariously agreed in 1856, being ratified with a Treaty of ambiguous but durable clauses on May 24, 1857 in Buenos Aires, to where Llanquitruz and Saygüeque traveled with their retinue, to sign it with Governor Valentín Alsina. It was conceived as an agreement between two entities, "the chief of the South" and "the Government of the State of Buenos Aires", who acknowledged their respective jurisdictional boundaries and indulged a contradictory notion to the indigenous autonomy. Llanquitruz confirmed and extended the assignment of lands to the province, making it responsible and beneficiary of the police power over the interior of the River Negro.

The first article established the freedom of trade between two classes of subjects, "all the tribes and Indians from Chief Llanquitruz or his friends " on one side and "all inhabitants anywhere in the State of Buenos Ayres who wishes to go to trade with those tribes and Indians". The second article recognized that their ancestors had

35 Letter to the Governor of Patagonia "Citizen Don Álvaro Barros", March 8, 1880, by Juan Ñancucheo, Antonio Modesto Yncayal, Foyel Payllacamino and N. Guircaleufo from "the Camp of Las Manzanas" (AGN VII, dossier 723, f. 406).
36 Llanquitruz to Villar, June 16, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
ceded to the "[…] old Government from the King Spain the land known from Patagones to San Javier", distant fifty kilometers. Llanquitruz would form a village with his people where he envisaged the construction of a church and a school. Designated "Commander in Chief of the entire territory of la Pampa adjacent to the jurisdiction of Patagones", he would have to make military and vector vanguard of the civilization. If the Government decided to fortify the upstream of the Choele-Choel Islands, Llanquitruz would provide unpaid assistance. The chief would have to settle down and set residence in "[…] the passage of Balchetas, and 55 leagues outside of Patagones with the force of 80 men and also eight chiefs", all salaried and rationed.

Despite not conceiving it, the Treaty with the State of Buenos Aires was the legal basis to justify the subsequent imagination of the autonomous project of mapuche manzanera government, whose sovereign status was not contemplated in the ambiguities of the Treaty but yet loomed in the conceptions of the territory and the legitimacy of power that was granted to Llanquitruz. The crisis of 1856 was the opportunity to resume the policy of Rosas in the construction of the hegemony of the State between the Patagonian Indians, through the gradual territorial setting and the military rather than civilian assimilation of mapuche-tehuelches families and their headquarters. The practices of captivity and raids would be social and economically relevant in the new period, in benefit of State rations and commercial cattle, which would increase the movement of individuals and groups between the forts, ranches and camps.

Julián Murga, who had already been a military commander of Carmen de Patagones between 1854 and 1855, boosted during the 1860s the indigenous mediators that led the process of narrowing relationships between the State and landowners. The installation of Llanquitruz in Balcheta until his assassination in 1858, the residence of Chingoleo and Miguel Linares closer to Carmen de Patagones, accelerate the verticality and the militarization of the "relative-chiefs " that sent to their rations from the country of Las Manzanas and the Northern Patagonian interior, until reaching the territorial control of the whole basin of River Limay-Negro.

Initially conceived as a precarious arrangement to ensure the return of animals and captives, the settlement of the "parliament-raid " of 1856 cost over twenty thousand dollars to the provincial Treasury, according to the surrenders of Villar.37 However, the returns were going to be enduring since it produced the final rupture between the families of Calfucurá and Reuque on one side and of Llanquitruz and Saygüeque on the other, enhancing opportunities for landowners and merchants to

37 Report of the military commander of Patagones, August 4, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
expand their business networks. The murder of the "Chief of the Tehuelche camp" Llanquitruz would take steps to the global forms of identity that managed Saygüeque with a "manzanera" base. The southern territoriality which was attributed to Villar at the beginning of the events, or the perception of the regional dimension of conflicts between chiefdoms coincided with

[...] the opinion of everyone here who perfectly know Yanquetruz is that he will not negotiate with Bahía Blanca because, there, he does not know anyone, being also those who have proven that the Indians from Mayor Iturra not to go to the field of Yanquetruz. As there are so informed hopes of negotiations to commence Yanquetruz with Patagones for their fields, I wish Your Honor draw me in this Case the conduct that should be observed and to what extent it could take the demands, which is where to start negotiations with the Indians.38

Villar pointed out that Llanquitruz would not be more negotiating further North for not having known people in Bahía Blanca, justified caution if it is to recall that two years later, he were to be killed exactly there. Mayor Iturra was the main mediator between Buenos Aires and Calfucurá, whose Indians neither wanted to have arrangements in Carmen de Patagones because it was the territory of Llanquitruz. In the light of these documents, the Argentine strongmen did not exceeded the status of enclaves and the regions continued being perceived as the "field" of one or another chief, of one or another lineage, able of imposing to the State its relational structure of segments.

In the mapuche-tehuelche society, the "war machines" are configured as rhizomes, where any line can connect with another in a field of full multiplication and fragmentation, as seen from the schism of Llanquitruz from the side of Calfucurá and Paillacan, where the negotiation with each lonko or gamákia39 did not guaranteed bargaining with all of them: "In a rhizome there are no points or positions such as in a structure, a tree, a root." There are only lines in a rhizome" (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 14). Abusing these authors, for whom "[...] the State is not defined by the existence of heads, is defined by the perpetuation or conservation of organs of power" (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 364-365), the mapuche-tehuelche "war machine" had another origin, it was irreducible to the State apparatus, foreign to its sovereignty and prior to their right. Here lies a palpable difference between Llanquitruz "machine" and

38 Benito Villar to Bartolomé Mitre, may 8, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5).
39 Lonko in the mapuche language means "head" and Gamákia means "my cacique" in nearly yájitch, the language of the families of the Northern Patagonian interior (HARRINGTON, [s.d.] Cuaderno I: 107).
Saygüeque’s "new type of headquarters", who consumed twenty-five years of the project behind the Treaty of 1857 that he had signed with the State. A not erratic policy on the edge of the State, without fluctuations or need to become langemtupe or "handsome matador". Recalling the murder of Llanquitruz in Bahía Blanca by the hands of Christians, Saygüeque himself clarified the changes, because he and his other cousin Chingoleo had refrained from avenging it, although everything "[...] is to nothing because this is hard on his brothers, sons and relatives". These developments occurred against a Criolla society that responded also vengeful, as reflected in the stories justifying the murder of Llanquitruz by the previous killing of the soldiers in the canton of San Antonio de Iraola.

The "war machine" worked uneasily as a deterrent of domination in the Northern Patagonia around 1870. How to characterize these Indians who say Diego Escolar "desired the State"? How to define between "indigenous Headquarters" and the "State society"? What did the State mean for Saygüeque? A mediator between two worlds, he multiplied senses and ambivalent behavior, impersonated the power calling himself "Superior Government", combined diverse legitimacy every time he enunciated the teachings of his father as if they were articles of a Constitutional Charter. The formalization of the power and range, the verticality of kinship and the break-up of reciprocities, sold out the gleam of the "machine" in its moment of greatest splendor, in the passage of the warrior men to peaceful men, entering the dead-end of the subject. Paradoxically, this happened when the hosts of Julio Argentino Roca were contaminated by the "war machine" in their mode of counter-raid.

Therefore, it can be seen as a process of "State contagion" experienced by the indigenous authority of Saygüeque, faced with another inverse of "segmental contagion" of the State apparatus. The emphasis on radical exteriority between Indian and State machines enabled the reading of the parallel between the "nationalization-weakening " of mapuche-tehuelche power and the "nomadization-reinforcement " of State power, with the risk of replacing the schematic binary from one pole to another, put in doubt by the same thesis of Deleuze and Guattari, who argue that the State is in relation to this “outside”, with this exteriority and the challenges of the "war machines". To mitigate this, another chapter of Mil Mesetas, "1933 Micropolítica y

40 Valentin Saygüeque to Commander Julián Murga, River Limay, April 30, 1863 (ARCHIVO DEL GENERAL MITRE, doc. Nº 4509).
41 Diego Escolar, personal communication.
42 AGN VII, dossier 723, f. 384
43 “[...] It seems difficult to argue that State, or even our modern States, are less segmental. The classical opposition between centralized and segmental does not seem very relevant. The State is
segmentaridad”, postulates a form of continuity and interweaving between the State and nomadic forms where the State is recognized as the point of resonance of the centralization that face the "war machines". According to those, the State is not achieved by abolishing segments, but organizing them and subordinating them concentrically. It is the case with the hosts from Roque who were contaminated by the "machine", but at the same time were verified and homogenized as the State apparatus strengthened by 1880. It was in the context of the political centralization of the 19th Century in Patagonia that the mapuche-tehuelches headquarters emerged, and their ephemeral escape lines in relation to power, whose story I have been concerned with in this work.

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not only exercised in segments that maintain or let survive, but it has in itself its own segmentarity and it imposes it.” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 215)


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**Picture 2** - Excerpt from the letter from Llanquitruz to Commander Benito Villar, June 6, 1856 (AGN X, 19. 4. 5)
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